Situation
The Polish Border Guard has announced that Poland will start building a 200 km fence along the border with Kaliningrad, Russia next month.
Shelling locations reported by UA general staff today
Overview images
Weather next 24 hours- Partly-Mostly Cloudy. Low Temp -7C (south) to -10C (east), Wind from north-northeast at 6-13 m/s THU-SAT (FEB 9-11) Partly-Mostly Cloudy. Low Temp -9C to -5C SUN (FEB 12) Snow. Low Temp -5C to -3C
Bakhmut
A close-up map of the approximate situation around the city of Bakhmut. Russian forces advanced West from their positions in Blahodatne.
Opinion by Michael Kofman:
A few thoughts on the current course of the war. Although winter has proven a transitional phase, with both sides focusing on force reconstitution and positional fighting. The outlines of the coming months & likely offensive operations are steadily becoming clearer.
After Kharkiv & Kherson, the Russian military was at its most vulnerable going into the winter. Mobilization helped stabilize Russian lines, raise manning levels, and establish reserves. Consequently, Ukraine no longer enjoys a significant manpower advantage.
Russia adopted a largely defensive strategy under Surovikin focused on force reconstitution, entrenchment, and a strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Bakhmut was not an exception, largely fought by Wagner PMCs from RU prison system. When mobilization was launched I was wary of the uncertainty it introduced, and its potential to significantly extend the war. At the time, a reasonable timeline to assess what Russia could make of mobilized personnel was 3-4 months.
It’s fair to say since October Russia has likely doubled the force deployed in Ukraine, and significantly reduced the length of the front being defended after retreating from Kherson. Force density has therefore increased relative to territory being occupied. The Ukraine official figure on Russia forces (320k) strikes me as a bit high, but 250k+ is probably fair. Russia may have another 150,000 mobilized personnel still in Russia, not deployed. However, readiness level and quality of these units remains unclear.
How strong the Russian defensive lines are in practice has yet to be truly tested. Russia has manpower in quantity now & continues to pull equipment out of storage, but force quality appears relatively low. This limits offensive potential & force employment options.
In brief, mobilized units in aggregate do not appear as poor as anecdotes might lead one to believe, and Russia can likely offer a stubborn defense, but are less liable to be suitable for offensive operations and represent weak replacements for lost regulars.
Russia still depends on airborne and naval infantry at key points along the front as the reserve, for counter attacks, and the main assault force. These units backstop mobilized personnel, but seem to have lost some of their offensive edge due to replacements.
After Soledar, the situation around Bakhmut increasingly looks precarious for Ukraine, and I wouldn’t be surprised if they ultimately withdraw from the city. However, Ukraine has strong defensive lines outside Slovyansk/Kramatorsk while Russia looks ill positioned to sustain momentum. Bakhmut is geographically important, but has developed a degree of sunk cost mentality for both sides. A fair bit of Ukraine defense there seems to consist of TDF, NG, and foreign legion units suggesting Ukraine is trying to manage the impact of attrition on its force availability.
Having lost Izyum and Lyman, Russia has no supporting axis of attack into Donetsk from the north, nor have their forces been able to make breakthroughs in the south of Donetsk. Hence gaining Bakhmut, in my view, offers opportunities for Russia that they’re not positioned to exploit.
**Since June I’ve been skeptical that Russia could make break through to Slovyansk/Kramatorsk. They’re still at Bakhmut 7 months later. That said, Ukraine has ceded much of the initiative since October in Donetsk, and recently Luhansk.**
Ukraine had made progress at Kreminna and Svatove, though now under counter-attack by the VDV’s 76th GAAD. Kreminna is a gateway to Rubizhne. For Ukraine, a breakthrough the Svatove-Kreminna line can eventually lead to the Russian logistical hub of Starobilsk. Hence the battle for Kreminna is arguably more significant than Bakhmut. That said there’s been a fair amount of reorganization in Russia logistics, and adaptation. I think the conversation on Russian logistical problems in general suffers from too much anecdotalism & received wisdom.
In my view Donbas remains the primary goal of Russia mil operations, hence Russia offensives are likely to focus on seizing this territory. I’m skeptical of claims that Russian forces will attempt a much larger scope offensive involving the cities of Kharkiv, Sumy, Kyiv, etc. I would consider a Russian attempt to advance Kreminna -> Lyman as likely, also Kupyansk, along with attacks across southern Donetsk, i.e. at Vuhledar. The fighting for Vuhledar, along with attacks elsewhere, suggest that this offensive has already begun in practice.
Russia’s better forces and kit, VDV and NI, have been trying to unsuccessfully press Ukrainian forces out of Vuhledar. The 155th couldn’t do it under Surovikin at Pavlivka in November, so its unsurprising Gerasimov taking over has done nothing to improve Russian offensive performance.
With respect to Belarus, a repeat assault on Kyiv makes little sense. An operation to sever supply lines in the west, or to seize the nuclear powerplant by Rivne, may be more feasible, but this would require a much larger force than what Russia currently has deployed in Belarus.
How large of a Russian offensive to expect is unclear, but I suspect it may prove underwhelming, focused largely on the Donbas. Russia may not need another large mobilization wave, and instead could keep mobilization quietly rolling at a sustainable rate.
Arguably, Ukraine is better served absorbing the Russian attack & exhausting Russian offensive potential, then taking the initiative later this spring. Having expended ammunition, better troops, and equipment it could leave Russian defense overall weaker. But, I suspect Kyiv does not believe that time is on Ukraine’s side. Wary of Russian entrenchment and seeking to avoid the perception of a stalemate, Ukraine is likely to move sooner than later. That’s been the trend thus far.
Western equipment may not arrive in time to be relevant for a Ukraine offensive, but more significant in that it will allow Ukraine to launch operations this spring knowing they have replacements secured. Hence the likely losses entailed won’t leave Ukraine vulnerable later this year.
In general Ukraine is still advantaged going into 2023, backed by countries with much greater GDP and defense industrial capacity. However, that depends on sustainability of external material support, and in the end potential is not predictive of outcomes.
The challenge is providing Ukraine with sufficient relative advantage to enable offensive operations under changed conditions in 2023. Unlikely to be solved by any single capability, but through a combination of means, organizational adaptations, and changes in force employment. Ukraine wants to build out 3 corps with 3-4 brigades each. This requires additional manpower and equipment. I’ve seen signs that Ukraine is still conducting mobilization to replace losses and generate additional units.
My sense is Russia is preparing a follow on mobilization wave, and we will see it eventually, but doubt it will be for this offensive, or at ~500k. I’m skeptical they can equip or sustain another wave at this stage.
UA Air Force
Ukrainian Mi-8 and Mi-24 operations from a forward airstrip. Note the fairly ubiquitous gunship armament of S-8 unguided rockets in B-8V20-A rocket pods.
Destroyed
A Russian BMP-1 and two BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles were destroyed during recent fighting in the East.
Su-35S
Big bada boom again.
Grenade interrupts an enemy discussion group
Video of artillery strikes by Ukraine’s 45th Artillery Brigade reportedly on two Russian 2S1 Gvozdika howitzers.
Ukrainian drone does not allow Russian invaders to fortify their defense lines. The drone drops grenades at the excavator that digs trenches for Russian soldiers somewhere in eastern Ukraine.
Eastern direction, Ukrainian tank fires at Russian positions.
Destroyed Russian BMP-1
The drone of the 30th brigade attacks the Russians.
109 OGSHB finishes off a stray occupier! Death in agony is the only thing we can offer you!
The 501st OBMP posted a full video of yesterday’s work!
Drones
No Comment
Bakhmut
Ukrainian border guards shot down a Russian attack aircraft in the sky over Bakhmut. The video shows the place where the plane crashed.
Donetsk
Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian T-80BVM tank in the vicinity of Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast.
Tankers of the 30th OMBr destroy Russian infantry in the Donetsk region.
Calculation of MT-12 “Rapira” 36 OBMP works on the concentration of the enemy, Donetsk region
Kharkiv
Destroyed Russian tank T-72B3 in Kharkiv region
Luhansk
Ukrainian 92nd Mechanized Brigade destroyed a Russian T-80BV tank in Luhansk Oblast.
Destroyed Ukrainian 122mm self-propelled artillery “Gvozdika” Location: near Kreminna Luhansk region
Vuhledar
An usual environment in Vuhledar.
30+ Destroyed/Damaged Russian tanks, BMPS. Location: Vuhledar, Donetsk region.
The aftermath of an attempted Russian attack on Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast yesterday: a Russian BMP-1 was destroyed, a T-80BV with a KMT-7 mine trawl, BMP-2 and another BMP-1 were damaged and abandoned.
Destroyed Russian BMP-2 Location: near Vuhledar Donetsk region
Three Russian tanks were destroyed/damaged near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast - apparently by running over anti-tank landmines.
Yes, still Vuhledar direction
A Russian Bmp-3 (possibly bmp-2) was destroyed by a mine in the vicinity of Vuhledar.